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Abstract 
We embed a North-South trade model into an incomplete contracts setting where the 
production of heterogeneous firms can be geographically separated. When a Northern 
headquarter contracts with a Southern supplier instead of a Northern supplier, the presence of 
international incomplete contracts may lead to a higher price. As a result, trade liberalization, 
that induces offshoring, is not necessarily welfare-enhancing for consumers, despite the lower 
cost of labor in the South. In addition, firms which use the supplier's component intensively, 
offshore their supplier in the South using outsourcing. As trade costs fall, less component-
intensive firms also offshore, but by vertically integrating their supplier. We argue that this 
organizational change increases production-shifting in the South, implying that a larger 
number of varieties will be produced in the South where contracts are incomplete. We show 
that, this may reduce consumer welfare in both countries. 
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© F. Defever, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
One commonly-observed pattern corresponding to the increasing fragmentation of pro-
duction is that an increasing number of rms have relocated their production to low-wage
countries while siting their strategic functions (e.g. Headquarters, and Research & De-
velopment centers) in developed countries. A good example is the opening of Eastern
European markets in the Nineties which triggered a wave of production relocation.1 This
phenomenon led to the closing of many Western plants,2 which may explain the layman's
suspicion of such relocations. Recently, the main trade union at Renault, the French
car-maker, denounced a \strategy which consists in looking for the highest prot on each
vehicle [without any] fall in price to stimulate consumer demand".3 This remark may seem
bizarre, as the main argument in favor of relocating to low-wage countries is precisely the
expected fall in costs and retail prices.
Nevertheless, consumer welfare may well be reduced if each sub-contractor extracts a
share of the prot before passing any savings on to consumers. Thus, oshoring could
lead to greater prots but not necessarily to lower prices; in the limit consumers may
even end up worse o. In this paper, we argue that the incompleteness of international
contracts may well be at the heart of this distortion. Under incomplete contracts the well-
known hold-up problem induces relationship-specic under-investment by agents, leading
to higher prot margins and higher prices/mark-ups, which in turn likely aect consumer
welfare negatively. Hence, the weak contractual environment in low-wage countries may
help us to understand why increasing world trade does not seem to have squeezed consumer
prices as much as might have been expected.4
1Notably in the Automobile sector: in only two years, most of the production capacity of Central and
Eastern European producers was acquired by only four Western carmakers: Volkswagen, General Motors
(Opel) and Renault in 1991, and Fiat in 1992.
2The following examples are from the automobile sector. Renault: Billancourt (France) in 1991, Setubal
(Portugal) in 1996, Vilvoorde (Belgium) in 1997. Fiat: Chivasso (Italy) in 1992, Rivalta (Italy) in 2001.
3Liberation (a daily French newspaper), November, 10th 2006, our translation.
4A recent study published by the OECD (2006) has conrmed that globalization has only a small impact
on consumer prices. Over the period 1995 to 2005, the net eect of imports from low-wage countries was
small and consumer price ination in Japan and the US \might have even been lower in the absence of
globalization" (see OECD, 2006, p.38). Empirical work by Kamin et al. (2006) has also suggested that
the impact of Chinese exports on global import prices over the 1993-2001 period was fairly modest. Using
rm-level data, Halpern and Koren (2007) propose evidence of a pricing behavior directly related to the
\double marginalization" problem. In their study, the rm' market power raises its mark-up, and ultimately
increases the import price. This counter innitive result has also been found in sectoral analysis. Using
a panel of 66 industries and 12 countries of the European Union, Egger and Egger (2004) nd a positif
eect of import of intermediate inputs into rms' markup. As a result, the price-cost margins would have
decrease faster if the observed increase in oshoring had not taken place in the 90s. Boulhol (2008) also
conrms the absence of impact of the increase of imports on price-cost margins using 13 OECD countries
2Recently, papers have introduced search frictions or inecient organization form to
study the eect of trade liberalization. Using incomplete contract as a source of distortion,
we see our paper as part of this ongoing literature. Antr as and Costinot (2011) develop
a model of international trade with intermediation. In a perfect competition framework,
they study the impact of regional integration on welfare. In their model, producers must
be matched with a trader in order to have access to these markets. Search frictions
and high bargaining power of Northern intermediaries may lead the South to be worth
o. Under certain circumstances it may even lead to a possible aggregate welfare losses.
Another interesting paper for us is Conconi et al. (2009). Their framework is quite dierent
from ours, as it is a perfectly-competitive trade model and it considers a distinct setting of
organization design. Interestingly, they show that trade liberalization can lead to inecient
organizational form and adversely aect consumers, as in our paper.
A growing literature has introduced incomplete contracts into Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman
monopolistic-competition models in order to examine rms' organizational choices (see
Grossman and Helpman, 2002, Antr as, 2003 and Antr as and Helpman, 2004).5 Surpris-
ingly, while it is well-known that Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980) models
have been developed to deal with welfare questions, the recent developments in New Trade
Theory do not usually address the specic welfare implications of contract incompleteness.
Mitra and Ranjan (2008) and Naghavi and Ottaviano (2010) are two notable exceptions.6
The economic-geography framework is a simple way in which to analyze the welfare
impact of globalization, both in the North and the South. However, standard economic-
geography models only seldom consider multinational rms. A number of papers such as
Fujita and Thisse (2006) and Robert-Nicoud (2008) allude to their existence, but relate
the fragmentation of production solely to communication costs. We extend this liter-
ature by instead considering that international relationships are plagued by incomplete
contracts. To this end, we embed an an economic-geography model into an incomplete-
contract setting. Our results are consistent with the empirical ndings mentioned above,
since oshoring is shown to lead to higher prot margins and potentially higher prices.
over the last three decades.
5See also Grossman and Helpman (2004), who apply the incentive-systems framework of Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1994) to managerial compensation in global production. Verdier and Marin (2003) and
Puga and Treer (2002) extend the Aghion and Tirole (1997) theory of delegating authority to a full
general-equilibrium model. See Helpman (2006) and Spencer (2005) for surveys of the literature.
6See also the rst working paper version of Antr as (2005), which considers the welfare impact of the
product cycle when contracts are incomplete in a dynamic Ricardian model.
3Producing a nal good requires the use of relationship-specic inputs from both a
supplier and headquarters, but only the former's production can be located abroad. When
a Northern headquarters (HQ for short) transacts with a local supplier, the setting is one
of complete contracts. On the contrary, when headquarters chooses to contract with
a Southern supplier, contracts are considered as incomplete. Building on the seminal
work of Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986), the presence of incomplete
contracts creates hold-up problems, which in turn give rise to suboptimal relationship-
specic investments by the parties involved in an international transaction. This leads to
suboptimal prices and higher prot margins. A key mechanism is that the protability of
oshoring is not directly related to the level of prices under incomplete contracts. Thus, as
trade is liberalized, oshoring may become protable for some rms even if it corresponds
to an increase in prices. If the lower Southern cost of labor is not sucient to overcome
the higher costs associated with international contractual incompleteness, the relocation
process leads to a higher \average price" which is detrimental to consumers' (workers')
welfare. Hence, the crux of our analysis is that, contrary to the existing literature, trade
liberalization can lower consumer welfare in both countries.
In our model, rms are heterogeneous in terms of supplier's component intensity (i.e.
the fraction of the inputs involved in the production that can potentially be oshored).7
For component-intensive rms, the benets associated with lower wages in the South tend
to outweigh the distortions from contractual incompleteness. As in Antr as (2003) and
Antr as and Helpman (2004), the relative importance of the supplier in production also
determines the ownership structure, i.e. component-intensive rms prefer outsourcing
instead of integration. As we reduce transport costs the number of rms oshoring their
production in the South increases. As a result, component-intensive rms oshore rst
via outsourcing. Then, as trade becomes increasingly free, the less component-intensive
rms start to oshore also, but by vertically integrating their supplier. We argue that
switching from outsourcing to integration increases production-shifting in the South. This
implies more suppliers in the South, such that fewer goods need to be imported there.
Moreover, vertical integration limits the price distortion due to the incomplete contracts.
In this case, the South should benet from the change of organization. Strikingly, this is
not the case if the costs associated with contractual incompleteness are suciently high
7Defever and Toubal (2007) provides empirical evidence of heterogeneity among rms in terms of sup-
plier's component intensity.
4that rms with a vertically-integrated Southern supplier have a higher price than rms
using insourcing. In fact, combined with the greater production-shifting, this implies that
a larger number of varieties will be produced in the South at a higher price. Hence, the
change of organizational mode is not necessarily benecial in terms of welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the frame-
work of the model and, in particular, develops the contractual setting. Section 3 studies
oshoring considering only outsourcing as a possible organizational mode; Section 4 then
extends the argument by allowing rms to choose between vertical integration and out-
sourcing. Finally, Section 5 presents our concluding comments.
2 The Model
2.1 Framework
Consider a world with two countries, North (N) and South (S), and two internationally-
immobile factors of production: capital (K) and labor (L). The North is endowed with
capital owners and workers, while the South only possesses workers. Workers supply
one unit of labor while capitalists own one unit of capital. The utility function of the
representative consumer is quasi-linear (in order to abstract from income eects) with











; for l = N;S (1)
where   1   1=, with  > 1 being the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Cl
T and Cl
M are the consumptions of, respectively, the homogenous traditional good (T)
and the composite industrial good (M) in country l, nw is the total number of varieties
worldwide, and  measures the demand for M-goods.
The consumer program is solved in two steps: rst, the consumer allocates his total
spending between consumption of the M-sector composite good and the traditional good.
From (1) we obtain:
Cl
T = Y l    ; Cl
M =







where l is roughly the inverse of the price index and Y l is nominal income. Then, in
a second stage, CM is allocated between the dierent varieties. This yields the following







where El  Ll + Kl, stands for endowments, and not for \income" as is usual in the
literature. This is because we have assumed quasi-linear preferences which ensure that
the consumption of the M-good is independent of nominal income. We denote the share
of Northern endowment by sE  EN=(EN + ES).
Both countries produce both type of goods. The T-sector is perfectly competitive in
which a homogeneous good is produced using labor under constant returns to scale. We
denote the wage in the North by wN, and that in the South by wS. As in Fujita and
Thisse (2006) and Antr as and Helpman (2004), we assume that workers in the North are
more productive than those in the South in producing traditional goods, which leads in
general equilibrium to a constant wage dierential between the two countries, denoted by
!  wN=wS > 1.
The M-sector uses both labor and capital to design horizontally-dierentiated goods.
More specically, starting the production of a new variety requires one unit of capital, so
that nw, the \xed" total number of rms, equals KN. Due to a substantial comparative
advantage in headquarters' activities, we consider that all headquarters are located in the
North.8 In addition to the xed cost, the production of a variety i of the nal good requires




where z  z z(1 z) (1 z), xh is the input produced by the HQ, xm is the input produced
by the supplier M, and z is the share of component provided by the supplier and required
to produce the nal good. Both inputs require only one unit of labor per unit produced.
In the spirit of Williamson (1985), we assume that inputs are relationship-specic such
that they have no value outside this particular relationship. To obtain an input, each
Headquarter forms a contract with a supplier. The contract includes an allocation of the
residual rights and an up-front lump-sum transfer t paid by the Supplier. Considering an
8Another argument put forth by Fujita and Thisse (2006) is that co-location externalities between HQs
are strong enough to ensure that they are all located in the same country. This hypothesis could also apply
in our case.
6innite supply of suppliers in each country, competition among them will ensure that t
adjusts in order to make the chosen supplier break even.
The headquarters' input xh is necessarily produced near the HQ, i.e. in the North.9
However, Headquarters can choose to obtain the supplier's input xm from a supplier lo-
cated either at home (insourcing) or abroad (oshoring). In this latter case, they also
choose their organizational mode (vertical integration oshore or outsourcing oshore).10
When the headquarters chooses to transact with a supplier located in the North, the par-
ties can always appeal to an outside party to enforce an ex-ante contract. Alternatively,
Headquarters can transact with a Southern supplier, but the parties cannot write enforce-
able contracts contingent on the quantity of inputs at a specic price: this reects the
fact that protection of property rights is weak in the South. In this latter case, after the
inputs have been produced, i.e ex-post, the two parties will bargain over the surplus of
the relationship. Since the two parties renegotiate ex-post and the value of the inputs are
nil outside the relationship, this creates a hold-up problem. We assume that Generalized
Nash Bargaining leaves the HQ with a share  2 [0;1] of the revenues. The location of the
supplier and the organizational form are chosen ex ante by the HQ to maximize prot.
We assume that the headquarters' input is freely transferred between countries.11 Thus,
if the supplier M is located in the South, xh can be sent there costlessly. The nal good
is then sold to both countries from where the supplier is located: selling abroad incurs an
Iceberg transport cost, i.e.  > 1 units of the good have to be sent abroad to eectively
sell one unit there. Appendix A provide a general picture of the model.
We also introduce heterogeneity at the rm level: rms will produce nal goods that
embed dierent levels of component-intensity, something we model as a distribution of z.
That is, some nal goods will be mainly composed of supplier's input while others will
mostly encompass the headquarters' input. Concretely, we assume that z has a cumulative
distribution function of F(z). In this framework, entrepreneurs pay the xed cost (i.e. one
9In a related setting, Antr as (2005) assumes that the North has such a productivity advantage in
technological activities that xh will be produced in the North.
10In what follows, we distinguish between three organizational forms, i.e. Outsourcing, Vertical inte-
gration and Insourcing to which we associate the subscripts O, V and I respectively. We do not attach
traditional meanings to the terms \outsourcing " and \integration". Here, it should read \outsourcing
oshore" and \integration oshore" instead, that is, the production of the inputs is made by an supplier
in a foreign country.
11We can imagine that headquarters' activities cover everything that is R&D-related, and are as such
immaterial and easily transferable. For instance, considering a Nike shoe, the headquarters' input might
be a drawing of the shoe to be produced by the supplier. Conversely, the supplier's input concerns the
manufacturing and assembly processes.
7unit of capital) and then draw their z from this distribution. Contrary to Melitz (2003),
there are neither entry nor \beachhead" costs, which means that in equilibrium all rms
will be active and sell to both countries.
3 Oshoring using outsourcing
In the short run, rms maximize prots, taking the organizational structure and spatial
distribution of all other rms as given. We start by considering only two possible organi-
zational structures: insourcing and outsourcing oshore.
3.1 Prots and Prices
Insourcing Consider rst the case where the headquarters decides to deal with a local
supplier. As noted earlier, the setting here is one of complete contracts and the HQ simply








z  wNxh wNxm. This yields the following optimal price






Since the headquarters faces a constant elasticity of demand, the optimal price is equal








N corresponds to the demand faced by the Northern rm. It should be noted that,
despite the heterogeneity among rms, the headquarters which locate their supplier in the
North earn the same prot, as can be seen by the absence of z in (6).
Outsourcing Consider now the prot of a HQ that decides to deal with an inde-
pendent supplier located in the South. The two parties choose the quantities of in-
puts non-cooperatively so that their own payo is maximized. If both rms agree in





z . In contrast, if the parties fail to agree in the bargaining, both are
8left with nothing. Going back in time, the headquarters sets xh to maximize oQ w
Nxh,
while the supplier simultaneously chooses xm to maximize (1   o)Q   w
Sxm. Using (3)
and (4), standard calculations yield the investments in the intermediate inputs. Because
the parties fail to capture the full marginal return to their investments in the ex-post bar-
gaining, they underinvest in xh and xm. As a result, output is suboptimal and the price
is ineciently high. Combining the two rst-order conditions yields the following optimal







(o)1 z(1   o)z (7)
It is obvious that the price under outsourcing can be either higher or lower than pI. For
example, if the wage-gap is low, the gains stemming from the lower cost of labor in the
South do not compensate for the higher mark-up associated with contractual incomplete-
ness, and pO > pI. This property will play a signicant role in the welfare analysis of
Section 3.3.
Recall that ex ante, the supplier pays a transfer of t to the headquarters, which ensures
the supplier's participation in the relationship. In equilibrium, the supplier's prot minus
the transfer is equal to its ex-ante outside option, i.e. zero. The prot of the headquarters








S being the Southern demand function. The rst term in parentheses represents the
prot margin, which is always higher than that under insourcing. Finally, as shown in (8),
rms with dierent z earn dierent prots, which produces dierent incentives to locate
their supplier in the South.
Demand and prices From (3), and recalling that the nal good is sold from where
the supplier is located, the demand functions l with l = N;S of representative North-




















where the IO's encompass the two organizational modes (I, O), and    =(1 ) mea-
9sures the freeness of trade, with values between  = 0, for innite trade costs, and  = 1
for costless trade.
In standard economic-geography models all rms are identical, and only the number of
rms located in the North and in the South is important in determining prices. However,
with heterogeneous rms the oshoring of a supplier aects prices in a number of dierent
ways, depending on the component-intensity of the rm (i.e. z). In addition, not all rms
have the same incentives to oshore their supplier. It seems intuitive that the rms who
nd it the most protable to oshore production are those that have the most to gain from
low wages, namely the most component-intensive rms, i.e rms with the highest value
of z. However, for a given demand, the prot under outsourcing may fall with z if the
wage-gap ! is low and o is high. This is easily understood from the price equation under
outsourcing in (7), both the numerator and denominator of which may fall with z. 12
As the main purpose of our model is to examine production oshoring in low-wage
countries, it seems reasonable to assume a sucient wage-gap between the North and the
South, so that relocation is mainly driven by the benets accruing to rms from the lower
cost of labor in the South.13







Lemma 1 Under Condition 1, the rm that nds it the most protable to oshore its
supplier in the South is the rm that is the most component-intensive (i.e. z = 1). The
threshold value b z is dened as the component-intensity of the rm which is indierent
between oshoring and insourcing. All rms with z < b z remain in the North using in-
sourcing.
Proof 1 See Appendix B.1
Lemma (1) allows us to identify the component-intensity of rms which have already
oshored (using Outsourcing) and those which have not (using Insourcing) in order to
12The intuition behind this eect comes from the presence of two opposing forces: on the one hand, we
know that the supplier tends to underinvest, especially when o is high. This distortion is more severe
when z is high, because the higher is z, the greater the contribution of the supplier to production. On
the other hand, the higher is z, the larger the share of production the HQ can delocate to the South to
benet from the lower cost of labor. Hence, for a given o, when the wage-gap between the two countries
is substantial, the latter eect dominates and prot increases in z.
13In a dynamic setting, Antr as (2005) analyzes the case where o is high and the wage gap is suciently
low to ensure that O falls in z. Considering a product-cycle, rms decide to relocate their production
when their product is suciently standardized. The ensuing sequence of relocation is mainly driven by
rms' minimization of the ineciency associated with incomplete contracting.
10determine the Northern and Southern :

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In the rst expression, PI represents the varieties produced in the North and sold in the
North, while Po reects the varieties produced in the South and sold in the North. The
second expression is the analogy for the South.
3.2 Equilibrium
Each headquarter chooses the location of its supplier by comparing its prot under insourc-
ing to that under outsourcing and, in the long run, the spatial distribution of suppliers is
such that no rm has an incentive to change the location of its supplier. Using equations
(5)-(9), the prot gap can then be written as IO
 (z;b z)  I(b z)   O(z;b z):

IO









( I    O)

(11)
Note the presence of both z and b z in (11): rm prots depend on both its z and the z0s
of the other rms that have already oshored their suppliers.14
To nd the threshold, we solve the following condition for the marginal rm (i.e. the
rm that is indierent between moving and staying): 
IO
 (b z) = 0. This gives us the location
function, namely, b z as a function of the parameters. To this end, we need to nd the 's. In
order to solve the integrals in (10), we have to specify the shape of the probability function.
Concretely, we assume that z follows a continuous uniform distribution over [0;1].15 Since
the support interval for the mass of rms is the same as the support interval for the
distribution of the z0s, ^ z thus also represents the total number of rms in the North. The
introduction of heterogeneous rms and incomplete contracts does not produce a simple
analytical location function. The location function is actually a transcendental equation in
b z, which precludes obtaining closed-form solutions. However, we would be able to derive
14Note that since rms are atomistic, the rst rm to relocate has no impact on prices, and since they
are myopic they do not consider the impact of their relocation on prices.
15We choose a uniform distribution due to its essential \fractal" property, i.e. any fraction of a uniform
distribution is also uniform. The use of the more standard Pareto distribution (which also has this fractal
property) would have rendered the calculation of prices intractable, which are essential for the welfare
analysis in Section 3.3.
11our key results on consumer's welfare without resorting to numerical simulations.
Our framework remains, in essence, similar to that of Fujita and Thisse (2006). The
pattern of agglomeration is thus very rich since it depends on the interplay between ! and
sE. Two typical agglomeration patterns result, as shown in gure 1. Whenever the Home-
Market Eect is strong enough to oset the cost disadvantage, i.e. sE is high and ! is low,
the North attracts rms as trade becomes freer but trade costs remain high; as trade is
further liberalized, suppliers locate in the South. Whenever wages are much lower in the
South, so that wage-gap is large, rms steadily and gradually oshore their suppliers in
the South, even when trade costs are high. In what follows, we focus for simplicity's sake
on the case where rms always gradually shift their production in the South and never
agglomerate in the North:
Condition 2 ! is high enough and sE is low enough such that, for any value of , db z
d < 0
Figure 1: The two patterns of the location function
3.3 Comparing Northern and Southern welfare
As nominal wages are independent of the location of suppliers, and as the number of rms
(varieties) is xed, the changes in consumer welfare result only from changes in national
prices. As the South is only composed of workers (consumers), movements in Southern
12welfare are only driven by changes in Southern prices. In the North, there are both capital





IO as indirect measures of the Northern and Southern consumer's welfare: an increase of
the price index, which reduces the 's, is detrimental to welfare. In order to tidy up the
results, we set wN =  and wS = =! in the following calculations.
Trade liberalization has three eects on Northern and Southern welfare. First, an in-
crease in  obviously increases the welfare of both countries since it lowers the cost of
importing foreign goods. Second, rms oshore in the South, which is detrimental for the
North as more goods need to be imported, and benecial for the South for the same rea-
son. This eect is of course all the stronger with higher trade costs. These two eects are
standard in economic-geography models. Finally, the third eect stems from incomplete
contracts: since the price under outsourcing can be higher or lower than the insourcing
price, the \average price" (excluding trade costs) of varieties might increase as rms o-
shore in the South.
Formally, the interplay of these dierent forces can be evaluated by totally dierenti-















Note rst that trade liberalization is more likely to increase Southern welfare if ^ z is high,
that is if there are a lot of rms in the North. This is logical and reects the rst eect
alluded to in the previous paragraph. The second term (i.e. :d^ z=d) corresponds to the
second eect and is negative, and all the more so that  is high: this tells us that an addi-
tional supplier oshored becomes less and less benecial for the South as trade is liberal-
ized. The term inside square brackets is equivalent to (pI) =(1 ) (pO) =(1 ).16 This
shows the impact of an additional supplier oshored on local prices. If this is positive, then
even though Southern consumers benet from not having to import the newly-relocated
variety, they pay a higher price to buy it (excluding trade costs). This is so if and only if
(pI)=(1 )= < p
=(1 )
O . In that case, as rms oshore in the South, local prices rise and
welfare falls. This is all the more true with higher . Further, note that pO is decreasing
in ^ z under Condition 1: the gap between pI and pO rises as rms relocate in the South.
16As we have set w
N =  and w
S = =! in the calculations.















There are two main dierences from the previous analysis of Southern welfare. First, since
Po(^ z) is a decreasing function of ^ z, trade liberalization is now more likely to decrease
Northern welfare when ^ z is high. Second, the term inside square brackets, which is equiv-
alent to (pI) =(1 )   (pO) =(1 ), shows that Northern welfare is more likely to fall
with trade liberalization when trade costs are high: as in (12), the term inside square
brackets shows the impact of an increase in the number of suppliers oshored in the South
on local prices. Hence, Northern consumers will only benet from such an increase if the
price of the newly-located rm is low enough to compensate for the trade costs: formally,
this holds if and only if (pI) =(1 ) > p
 =(1 )
O .
As trade costs fall and the number of rms which oshore in the South rises, the
strength of the dierent eects listed above change. As trade becomes perfectly free, note
that the location of rms becomes irrelevant, and, as such, the two countries' welfare
levels converge. In this case, the key determinant of welfare is the tension between the
lower cost of labor in the South and contractual incompleteness. The following proposition
summarizes:
Proposition 1 Trade liberalization is likely to be welfare-reducing for both Southern and
Northern workers if the wage-gap is not high enough to oset the costs associated with
contractual incompleteness. This is all the more true if trade is free.
Two comments are in order with respect to Proposition 1. First, we assume that the
nominal wage is independent of the rms' location choice and that the number of rms
is xed. With these simplications, we abstract from other potential consumers' welfare
gains, such as an increase in the number of varieties available or an increase of the nominal
wage associated with the globalization process. Nevertheless, even if we had integrated
these additional eects, the welfare analysis would still balance the positive gains of the
trade liberalization with the distortion associated with the contracts' incompleteness. Sec-
ondly, our study does not argue against trade liberalization. In fact, our model is silent
about the impact of globalization on the aggregate welfare. We only argue that it may
negatively aect the real labor income. When prots generate by rms are only marginally
14distributed to the workers, it is a direct measure of consumers' welfare. This is the case
in our model, as we assume that rms' prots are completely allocated to capital owners.
3.4 Benchmark scenario with complete contracts.
To highlight the implications of contract incompleteness, we now present a scenario with
complete contracts in both the North and the South. In this case, rms are more likely
to oshore in the South as they can beneciate from low wages without being aected by
the contract incompleteness. However, rms still face the trade-o between low wages in
the South and being close to the biggest market, the North, to avoid paying too much
trade cost. As in the incomplete contract case, the rm that nds it the most protable
to oshore its supplier in the South is the rm that is the most component-intensive (i.e.
z = 1). All rms with z below a certain threshold value remain in the North.
When contracts are complete in both the North and the South, the price in the North
remains equal to pI = wN
 , as in equation (5), while the price in the South, which where
previously given by (7), is now equal to pO = (wN)
1 z(wS)
z
 . For simplication, we continue
to set wN =  and wS = =! in the following calculations. Thus, when contracts are















As previously mentioned, the term inside square brackets is equivalent to (pI) =(1 )  
(pO) =(1 ). However, under complete contracts, pI is now always higher than pO. Thus,
the term under bracket is always negative and equation (14) always positif. We can
conclude that under complete contracts, the South consumers always benet from the
trade liberalization. This result contrasts with our result previously highlighted in the
Proposition 1.
















The term inside square brackets is equivalent to (pI) =(1 )   (pO) =(1 ). As under
incomplete contacts, the term under bracket is negative for high trade costs (low value of
), implying that the North beneciate from lowering trade barriers for high trade costs.
However, the term does not integrate anymore the negative welfare eect associate with
15the price distortion.
4 Oshoring and the change in organization
We now introduce a third type of possible organization mode, which consists in the vertical
integration of a Southern supplier. Conditions 1 and 2 continue to apply.
4.1 Prots and Prices
Vertical Integration Following the property-rights approach to the rm developed by
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), ex-post bargaining will take place
under both outsourcing and integration. However, the distribution of surplus is sensitive
to the mode of organization. As in Antr as (2003) and Antr as and Helpman (2004), we
assume that the HQ will obtain a greater share of the surplus under vertical integration
than under outsourcing, i.e. v > o.
The headquarters maximizes vQ   wNxh by its choice of xh, whereas the supplier
at the same time chooses xm to maximize (1   v)Q   wSxm. Combining the rst-order
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Setting t so as to make the integrated manufacturing plant break even leads to the following
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Demand and prices The demand function k with l = N;S is analogous to that in








IO, since the 's now encompass
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16Equation (18) thus implicitly denes a unique value of z, z, \the cuto", which is the
component-intensity of the rm which is indierent between outsourcing and integration.
A key result is that the cuto value of z is independent of the respective size of the
two countries, their respective costs of labor, and the level of integration between these
countries. As shown by Antr as (2003), @=@z < 0. Hence, whenever z < z, vertical
integration is preferred, while for z > z rms prefer to outsource their production. The
economic rationale is the following: it is optimal to give the residual rights of control to the
party which undertakes the highest ex-ante investment. For instance, if z is high, the nal
good is composed mainly of the supplier's input, so the supplier is allocated the residual
rights of control and outsourcing is chosen. Furthermore, we henceforth assume:17
Condition 3 v = 1   o
Plugging this equality into (18) shows that the cuto is now explicitly determined, as
summarized in the following proposition:
Lemma 2 Under Condition 3, the cuto always takes on the value z = 1=2. In addition,
under Condition 1, for a given level of demand, prots under Vertical integration and
outsourcing are monotonically increasing in z. Hence, all rms with z < b z remain in the
North using insourcing. Firms with z > z = 1=2 nd it the most protable to oshore and
will use outsourcing. When the number of rms which oshore is high, i.e. b z < z, rms
with z < z = 1=2 oshore using integration.
Proof 2 See Appendix B.2
Lemma (2) allows us to obtain a constant \cuto" z = 1=2. This simplication will help
us to compute the price index (see below). It also permits to clearly identify the impact of
the change in organization on rm' price (mark-up). The following proposition compares
the price for value of z below the cuto, where rms are not allowed to integrate their
supplier (outsourcing-only world) and where they can.
Proposition 2 Under condition (3), when the number of rms which oshore is high,
i.e. b z < z, Vertical integration leads to a lower price as compared to outsourcing. Vertical
integration alleviates the price (mark-up) distortion associate with contract incompleteness,
as compared to an outsourcing-only world.
17Our results do not fundamentally depend on this assumption. It is only made for convenience since it
will allow us to obtain some analytical results in the equilibrium analysis (see also footnote ).
17Proof 3 See Appendix B.3
Lemma (2) allows us to identify prices when the marginal rm which is just indierent
between the North and the South (i.e. z = ^ z) has a lower z than the cut-o i.e. z, and as
such chooses to integrate its supplier. Meanwhile, the rms that have chosen to outsource
their production (i.e. z > z) continue to do so. The Northern and Southern deltas can
then be written as follows:

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where Pv(b z;z) represents the varieties produced in the South under vertical integration,
and Po(b z;z) represents the varieties that are produced under Outsourcing.18
4.2 Equilibrium
The headquarters chooses both the location of its supplier and its mode of organization,
and in the long run the spatial distribution of suppliers is such that no rm has an incentive
to change the location of its supplier or its mode of organization. At rst, outsourcing
dominates vertical integration, as rms with a high z start to oshore. In this rst stage,
as in Section 3.1, the headquarters compare their prot under insourcing to that under
outsourcing. Using equations (5)-(9), the prot gap in this rst stage can be written as
IO
 (z;b z)  I(b z)   O(z;b z):

IO









( I    O)

(21)
In the second stage, vertical integration dominates outsourcing: when the cuto is reached,
the rms with a relatively high z which have outsourced their production will continue to
do so, while the new rms that oshore choose integration as their mode of organization.
18Note that, for b z < z, Po(b z;z) is actually a constant since the number of rms that outsource their
production remains constant.
18The prot gap in the second stage can then be written as IO
 (z;b z)  I(b z)   V(z;b z):

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(22)
A critical feature of our model is that the switch between outsourcing and integration
depends on the level of integration between the two countries. Even though z does not
depend on  (see equation 18), this switch occurs for one particular value of trade costs,
the \Switch point" 19, 
SW. The remainder of the analysis is similar to that in Section 3.1.
4.3 Change in organizational form and the greater production-shifting
In this section, we compare the behavior of two location functions: one where rms are
not allowed to integrate their supplier (i.e. IO
 (^ z) = 0) and one where they can (i.e.
IV
 (^ z) = 0), for values of  greater than the switch point (where b z < z). An illustration
is provided in Figure 2. We observe that the two location functions are initially identical
up to the switch point, after which they diverge, as more suppliers are oshored under
integration than under outsourcing. We show that production-shifting in the South is
always higher under Condition 3:20
Proposition 3 Under Condition 3, at the cuto, switching to Vertical integration in-
creases production-shifting in the South, as compared to an outsourcing-only world.
Proof 4 See Appendix B.4
As shown in the Appendix, the greater number of suppliers oshored in the South stems
solely from @( V    O)=@^ z, that is, from the comparison of rm prots (for a given level
of demand) under the two modes of organization as in equation (18). Firms with lower z
fare better under vertical integration than under outsourcing, and vice versa. Considering
the behavior of a Northern rm in the second stage, it is clear that the rm's incentive to
19Note that the term \Switch Point" does not mean that rms switch from one organizational mode
to another: it means that, for trade costs lower than the Switch Point, the new rms that relocate their
supplier in the South (i.e. as trade becomes freer) will choose integration over outsourcing, whereas the
rms that have already relocated their supplier will continue to outsource their production.
20We also observe this divergence for a wide range of parameter values in numerical simulations. Never-
theless, considering that o and v are symmetric around 1/2 simplies the model and avoids non-linear
behavior around the cuto. Without this assumption, the rm which is indierent between the two modes
of organization has a dierent price and a dierent prot margin in the two modes, which complicates the
comparison between the two around the cuto point. In this case, it is possible to nd some congurations
of the parameters such that, around the cuto, the divergence does not take place. However, as we move
away from the switch point, the divergence always occurs.















Second stage Location Function 
in an Outsourcing-only world 
Figure 2: Greater production-shifting in the South under integration
oshore is smaller if it has to outsource its production than if it can internalize it, as its
shadow Southern prot is smaller in the rst case. This is all the more true with a lower
value of z. Thus, for a given value of trade costs, the marginal rm which oshores has a
smaller z than in an outsourcing-only world, because in that world this same rm would
nd it more protable to remain in the North.
This feature of the model shows that, a priori, the South should welcome further in-
tegration, not only for the standard reason that it magnies its comparative advantage
compared to the size-advantage of the other country, but also because, after the switch
point, the rms that oshore switch to integration so that production-shifting in the South
increases, which would appear benecial. The next section nuances this rst impression
by investigating how the welfare of both countries changes with trade liberalization.
4.4 Is Vertical integration welfare-enhancing?
It is of interest to examine in greater depth the impact of trade liberalization on the re-
lationship between Southern welfare and mode of organization. In particular, we would
like to know whether, after the Switch Point, the welfare of Southern workers under inte-





IO, as trade is liberalized.
We rst focus on Southern welfare. As shown above, vertical integration and outsourc-
ing have dierent characteristics. First, integration increases the shift of production to
20the South, which should be benecial for Southern workers since, for a given level of trade
costs, fewer goods are produced abroad (see Proposition 3). Further, when the cuto is
reached, i.e. b z < 1=2, the price of individual varieties under vertical integration is lower
than that under outsourcing (see Proposition 2). This should also benet the South (as
well as the North). However, a small wage-gap, pI < pV, combined with the increase in
production-shifting, implies that a greater number of varieties are now produced in the
South at a higher price. This is detrimental for welfare since the average price of varieties
is then higher. Formally, these forces can again be demonstrated by totally dierentiating




















































 = 0 location functions respectively. As we move away from the switch point, ^ zV
becomes smaller than ^ zO (i.e. there are more Northern rms in an outsourcing-only world).
The rst term in (23) is thus negative because the more rms there are in the North, the
more benecial is a given rise in . The second term is also negative, since the higher
is  the less benecial is an increase in the number of Southern suppliers. That is, the
increase in production-shifting is less benecial for the South with lower trade costs. The
last term is positive (since @Pv=@^ z < @Po=@^ z) and represents the gains associated with
the lower price under vertical integration compared to outsourcing.21 Finally, if the latter
term outweighs the rst two negative terms, the expression in (23) is positive, so that the
welfare-gap rises with . Moreover, the three terms do not change in the same way with
, which means that trade liberalization has a non-monotonic impact on the welfare-gap.
We now focus on the welfare-gap around the cuto (bearing in mind that the welfare-
gap is zero at the cuto point). This simplies the previous analysis and aids our intuition.
By denition, ^ zV = ^ zO =  z = 1=2; moreover, as we show in Appendix B.4, @Pv=@^ z =
21The impact of o on the welfare-gap is non-monotonic, since it reects two separate eects. First,
switching from outsourcing to integration lowers the price of the marginal variety: comparing pV and pO
shows that the gap between the two falls with o, so the switch is all the more benecial when o is lower.
Second, under integration, there are more Southern rms with price pV which may be higher than pI: if
pV > pI and ^ zV > ^ zO, the average price of the Southern consumer basket is higher under integration;
with lower o the price of a Northern variety is much less than the price of a Southern variety, so that the
second eect may well oset the rst.

































The rst term is simply the increase in production-shifting associated with the switch from
outsourcing to integration as discussed in Section 4.3; as such, this term is negative, so that
a given marginal increase in  leads to more suppliers being oshored under integration
than under outsourcing. The sign of the second term is more complicated. This represents
the impact of a change in ^ z (i.e. a new Southern location) on Southern prices.22 Since
pV = pO around the cuto, the sole impact of an additional Southern supplier comes from
the change in the price of the marginal rm, namely, from pN to pS. Of course, the greater
the wage-gap, the lower the price of a Southern compared to a Northern variety. Moreover,
it can be checked that the gap between the price of a Northern and Southern variety falls
with o. That is, with lower o the costs from contractual incompleteness are higher so
that an additional Southern supplier might increase prices. In this case, the switch from
outsourcing to integration reduces welfare as it increases production-shifting in the South.
Also, as the second term rises with 
SW, the switch is more likely to be welfare-reducing
if it occurs at low trade costs.
The analysis of the Northern welfare-gap is similar, except that the increase in production-
shifting is benecial for the South and detrimental to the North (everything else equal,
Northern consumers import more goods under integration). This eect will of course tend
to disappear as trade becomes increasingly costless, so that the two welfare-gaps converge.
The next proposition brings together these results:
Proposition 4 The switch from outsourcing to vertical integration can be welfare reduc-
ing for both Southern and Northern workers if the wage-gap is not high enough to oset
the costs associated with contractual incompleteness. This is all the more likely as trade
becomes freer.
5 Conclusion
This paper has introduced both incomplete contracts and heterogeneous rms in terms
of component-intensity into an economic-geography framework. We have investigated the
22Actually, the inverse of the price index.
22trade-os faced by rms deciding whether to shift a part of production abroad and whether
to integrate its supplier. We show that, as trade is liberalized, rms shift their production
to the South using outsourcing; as trade becomes even freer, new rms oshore in the
South, but prefer to integrate their suppliers.
Regarding consumer welfare, we show that trade liberalization does not necessarily
enhance the welfare of the country where the number of rms rises: if the costs associated
with contractual incompleteness are substantial, and oset the gains associated with lower
labor-costs, the price of a Southern variety is higher than the price of a Northern variety.
In this case, as trade is liberalized and rms relocate in the South, the average price of the
consumer basket increases, which is detrimental for consumer welfare in both the North
and the South.
Finally, we have also shown that switching from outsourcing to integration increases
production-shifting in the low-wage country. Additionally, the price of a given variety
produced under vertical integration is lower than that under outsourcing. A priori, these
reasons should be sucient to convince backward countries of the advantages emanating
from further trade liberalization, since this should be benecial for them. However, our
analysis suggests that the outcome is actually not that clear-cut since, as trade becomes
freer, the switch in organization might actually decrease both Northern and Southern
welfare.
Over the last decade, the number of regional agreements between developed and less-
developed countries has increased rapidly. The two best-known cases of regionalism are
undoubtedly the European Union (EU) system and the North American Foreign Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). These two types of integration are very dierent however. The
EU does not only concern a reduction in trade barriers: its scope is much wider since it
also includes a variety of institutional criteria that all countries should adhere to. Our
results underline the importance of such institutional convergence, notably in terms of the
quality of the judicial system, since this can alleviate the costs associated with international
contractual incompleteness. Further research is required to draw out more precisely the
links between economic integration, institutional reform and consumer welfare.
23References
Aghion, P. and J. Tirole (1997). Formal and real authority in organizations. Journal of
Political Economy 105(1), 1{29.
Antr as, P. (2003). Firms, contracts, and trade structure. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 118(4), 1375{1418.
Antr as, P. (2005). Incomplete contracts and the product cycle. American Economic
Review 95(4), 1054{1073.
Antr as, P. and A. Costinot (forthocming 2011). Intermediated trade. Quarterly Journal
of Economics.
Antr as, P. and E. Helpman (2004). Global sourcing. Journal of Political Economy 112(3),
552{580.
Boulhol, H. (2008). The convergence of price{cost margins. Open Economies Review 19(2),
221{240.
Conconi, P., P. Legros, and A. Newman (2009). Trade liberalization and organizational
change. CEPR Discussion Paper (No. 7028).
Defever, F. and F. Toubal (2007). Productivity and the sourcing modes of multinational
rms: Evidence from french rm-level data. CEP Discussion Papers 842.
Dixit, A. K. and J. Stiglitz (1977). Monopolistic competition and optimum product di-
versity. American Economic Review 67(3), 297{308.
Egger, H. and P. Egger (2004). On the relationship between international outsourcing and
price{cost margins in european industries. Review of Industrial Organization 25(1),
45{69.
Fujita, M. and J.-F. Thisse (2006). Globalization and the evolution of the supply chain:
Who gains and who loses? International Economic Review 47(3), 811{836.
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2002). Integration versus outsourcing in industry equilib-
rium. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 85{120.
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman (2004). Managerial incentives and the international orga-
nization of production. Journal of International Economics 63(2), 237{262.
Grossman, S. J. and O. D. Hart (1986). The costs and benets of ownership: A theory of
vertical and lateral integration. Journal of Political Economy 94(4), 691{719.
Halpern, L. and M. Koren (2007). Pricing to rm: an analysis of rm- and product-level
import prices. Review of International Economics 15(3), 574{591.
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1990). Property rights and the nature of the rm. Journal of
Political Economy 98(6), 1119{1158.
Helpman, E. (2006). Trade, fdi, and the organization of rms. Journal of Economic
Literature 44(3), 589{630.
Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom (1994). The rm as an incentive system. American
Economic Review 84, 972{991.
24Kamin, S. B., M. Marazzi, and J. W. Schindler (2006). The impact of chinese exports on
global import prices. Review of International Economics 14, 179{201.
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale economies, product dierentiation, and the pattern of trade.
American Economic Review 70(5), 950{959.
Melitz, M. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate
industry productivity. Econometrica 71, 1695{1725.
Mitra, D. and P. Ranjan (2008). Temporary shocks and oshoring: The role of external
economies and rm heterogeneity. Journal of Development Economics 87(1), 76{84.
Naghavi, A. and G. Ottaviano (2010). Outsourcing, complementary innovations and
growth. Industrial and Corporate Change 19(4), 10091035.
OECD (2006). Globalisation and ination in the OECD economies. Economics Department
Working Papers 524.
Puga, D. and D. Treer (2002). Knowledge creation and control in organizations. CEPR
Discussion Paper (3516).
Robert-Nicoud, F. (2008). Oshoring of routine tasks and deindustrialisation: Threat or
opportunity -and for whom? Journal of Urban Economics 63(2), 517{535.
Spencer, B. (2005). International outsourcing and incomplete contracts. Canadian Journal
of Economics 38(4), 1107{1135.
Verdier, T. and D. Marin (2003). Globalization and the new enterprise. Journal of the
European Economic Association 1(2-3), 337{44.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press.
25A Appendix: General picture of the model
The Headquarters (HQ) produces an input xh necessarily in the North. In addition,
the production of a nal good also requires another input from a supplier M. The HQ
can choose to obtain the supplier's input xm from a supplier located either in the North
(insourcing) or in the South (oshoring). In the latter case, the contracts are incomplete
and the HQ also chooses an organization mode (vertical integration oshore or outsourcing
oshore). The nal good is then sold in both the Northern market, EN, and the Southern
market, ES, from where the supplier is located: selling abroad incurs transport costs.
26B Appendix: Technicalities
B.1 Proof of lemma 1
We prove that, under Condition 1, prot under outsourcing always increases in z by
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Prot under integration increases with z if and only if the term in brackets is positive.
For o 2 [1=2;1], this is obviously true if ln(o=(!(1   o))) < 0, that is if ! >





For o 2 [0;1=2], the derivative is increasing in z if and only if (2o   1)(1   ) >
(pO)
 
1  ln(o=!(1   o)). The two sides of the inequalities are both functions of o. Let
G(o) be the left-hand side term and H(o) the right-hand side term. It can be shown
that: (i) for o 2 [0;1=2], the endpoints of H(o) are lower than the endpoints of G(o);
(ii) the two curves are monotonically increasing in o; and (iii) the two curves are concave
and do not change concavity. These three points taken together ensure that the function
H(o) is always under G(o) for o 2 [0;1=2] and, as such, that the derivative is positive.23

B.2 Proof of lemma 2
First, as shown by Antr as (2003), @=@z < 0 and equation (18) has a unique solution.24
Using Condition 3, and replacing v by 1   o in equation (18), it is obvious that z=1/2
is a solution.
Second, as shown in the proof of Lemma 1, prot under outsourcing is increasing in z
under Condition 1. We now prove that the prot under integration is also increasing in z
under Conditions 1 and 3. Using Condition 3, we can substitute o by 1 v in Condition
1. The wage Condition remains identical, except for v. In addition, as Condition 3 implies
23Note that, for o 2 [0;1=2], Condition 1 is not necessary to ensure that o increases in z. However,
this second part of Condition 1 will be useful in Section 4 in order to prove that prot under vertical
integration is also increasing in z under Condition 1.
24See Antr as (2003) for details, where his  corresponds to our 1   z here.
27that v is a function of o, we can simply use the proof of Lemma 1 to also prove that v
is increasing in z. 
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Using v = 1   o from Condition (3), and as by denition v > o, then v > 1=2 and
o < 1=2. Using the price under outsourcing pO and under vertical integration pV dened
respectively in equation (7) and (16), it is straightforward to show that pO=pV > 1 for a
given z < 1=2. 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We wish to show that the location function derived from IO
 = 0 is above that derived
from IV
 = 0 just after the cuto. As rms relocate in the South as trade becomes freer,
the two location functions are monotonically decreasing in .
We thus need to prove that, at the cuto, the slope of the second location function is
higher in absolute value than the slope of the rst function. We totally dierentiate those
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where  O,  I, and Po are dened in section 3.1. The total dierentiation of IV
 = 0 is
carried out analogously with Pv( z; ^ z) + Po( z) replacing Po(^ z) and  V replacing  O, where
 V and Pv are dened in Section 4.1. Recall that Condition 1 entails that z = 1=2. Two
important corollaries follow automatically:  O =  V and Pv = 0. These two simplications
ensure that the terms multiplying the d in the two total dierentiations, that is the partial
derivative of the prot-gap with respect to , are identical. Since rms relocate in the
South, this must be negative. Hence, we simply need to compare the two terms that
multiply d^ z, that is the partial derivatives of the two prot-gaps with respect to ^ z (which
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Dierentiating Pv and Po and evaluating them around z = 1=2 reveals that they are
identical, so that the rst term on the right-hand side is zero. Dierentiating  V and  O













1  [2(2o   1)(   1) + (   2)(ln(1   o)   lno)]
1   
the sign of which depends on the sign of 2(2o 1)( 1)+( 2)(ln(1   o)   lno)  B:
Note that B = 0 for o = 1=2. Furthermore, the sign of its derivative with respect to o
depends on the sign of (1   )[4o(o   1) + 1] + 1. The term inside the brackets has one
obvious root, namely, o = 1=2. It is greater than zero if o < 1=2: This is always the case
under Condition 3, which requires that o < 1=2 < 1   o < 1. Hence, B is an increasing
function of o and reaches its maximum at o = 1=2, where it is equal to zero: it is thus
negative for o 2 [0;1=2[: Hence, so is the dierence @ V =@b z   @ O=@b z. Finally, since
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